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Abstract 
 The origins of British-based trading companies are to be found in the international 
mercantile networks which linked together Britain's commercial centres with the rest of the 
world during the nineteenth century. One such network, drawing together participants with 
operations in Singapore and Sarawak, was formalized under the title of The Borneo 
Company Limited (BCL) between 1851 and 1856. To function effectively, these inter-personal 
networks of merchants required a high degree of trustworthiness among the participants in 
order to overcome principal/agent problems, since direct supervision from the headquarters 
in London was not feasible. However, in order to expand, it was necessary to widen the circle 
of network participants and to incorporate new types of competence. This contribution 
analyses the early history of BCL with a view to understanding the way in which the process 
of growth was managed, distinguishing between three different types of expansion: 
engaging in production as well as trade; extending the geographical scope of the 
organization; and diversifying into new markets.  
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Introduction 
 
 The importance of networks in facilitating the process of economic co-
ordination has been increasingly recognised by writers concerned with the evolution 
and operation of business enterprise (Fukuyama, 1995; Casson, 1997; Ebers, 1997).  
The co-ordinating role played by networks has been particularly well documented in 
the case of Asian business and trading groups (Hamilton, 1991; Brown, 1994; Ray 
1995) and in the international expansion of Britain‟s banking and shipping firms since 
the late ninteenth century (Jones, 1992; Boyce, 1995).  In each case these networks 
relied upon a variety of well-established social structures (Casson and Cox, 1997), 
which promoted a climate of mutual trust of sufficient robustness to allow 
decentralised decision-making to take place with little or no direct supervision.  By 
incorporating these network linkages within an economic framework, processes of co-
ordinated decision-making could be facilitated which would have proved more costly 
to operate under alternative institutional arrangements (Casson and Cox, 1993). 
 The activities of just such networks underpinned the expansion of Britain‟s 
trade and foreign investment activities during the nineteenth century (Cain and 
Hopkins, 1993; Davis and Huttenback, 1988).  International trading, as it passed from 
the control of state-sponsored chartered trading companies into private hands, was 
typically conducted and financed by merchant houses based around tight-knit family 
and kinship groups which thus constituted small-scale international business networks.  
The more successful of these merchant houses developed in one of two main ways 
during the course of the nineteenth century.  Those who generated strong financial 
reputations began to engage in the provision of services such as the endorsement of 
bills of exchange (accepting) and the sponsoring of loans for foreign governments and 
companies operating overseas (issuing).  From around 1870, the houses that 
specialised in providing these financial services began to be termed merchant banks, 
and these institutions played a leading role in stimulating the growth of Britain‟s 
foreign portfolio lending.  Alternatively, some merchants had developed a much 
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stronger presence in the overseas markets which they served, and these houses began 
to utilise their location-specific knowledge in order to identify and exploit investment 
opportunities which complemented their trading operations (Roberts, 1993). 
 These two types of merchant, whilst constituting independent organisations, 
frequently held family ties and common origins which bound them together into 
broader networks.  Scottish-based enterprises were particularly prominent in this 
process Parker (1985: 208).  Thus the house of Matheson & Co., for example, 
maintained close links with Jardine Matheson & Co. of Hong Kong and Jardine 
Skinner & Co. of Calcutta.  Similarly, another Scottish house, R. & J. Henderson, was 
closely allied to the Calcutta-based agency of George Henderson & Co.  These social 
linkages created an increasingly complex structure of interpersonal networks which, 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, began to pioneer the growth of 
Britain‟s foreign direct investment by channelling finance, resources and factors of 
production abroad, and generating a return flow of commodities, royalties and 
dividends (Jones, 1987; 1997).  Chapman (1985; 1992) has demonstrated how a 
number of the merchant houses with well-established branches overseas evolved into 
British-based investment groups.  These investment groups, whose activities covered a 
wide range of industries, can be seen to constitute the origins of a number of Britain‟s 
pioneering multinational corporations. 
 The transfer of foreign direct investment from Britain was boosted between 
1855 and 1862 by the passage of legislation which enabled the promotion of joint 
stock companies featuring limited liability (Payne, 1985).  This made it possible for 
British-based promoters to float small companies designed to invest in a commercial 
opportunity abroad, where investors could subscribe a fixed amount of their capital 
without fear of any extended liability.  These business enterprises have generally come 
to be termed free-standing companies (Wilkins, 1988).  The archetypal free-standing 
company was an enterprise that was financed in Britain to undertake one specific 
purpose in response to an investment opportunity which had arisen in an economy 
abroad; at the time of its formation it had no links with any other firm operating in the 
same industry and it brought together finance and resources in a purely bi-national 
fashion. 
 The character of free-standing companies has constituted an issue of debate 
among business historians, principally in relation to whether or not their activities 
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constituted a form of foreign direct investment (Casson, 1994; Corley, 1994; Hennart, 
1994a,b).  The question is complicated by the fact that companies which were 
originally floated as free-standing concerns often evolved into something different over 
time.  Wilkins‟ original identification of the phenomenon, however, was based 
fundamentally on the character of such organisations at the time of their formation.  In 
fact, a number of the companies that were formed in this way subsequently became 
incorporated into broader economic networks which reduced their free-standing 
nature.  Others, particularly those designed to provide infrastructural services, 
ultimately became incorporated into the local economy and ceased to be foreign 
investments.  Yet others evolved into more complex organisations and, in so doing, 
changed from free-standing to internationally-integrated multinational firms as 
explained by Jones (1996: 36). 
 Thus the mechanisms of international business co-ordination which radiated out 
from the British economy in the nineteenth century constitute a complex and varied 
phenomenon.  Whilst it is clear that the existence of networks supported much of this 
activity, detailed empirical evidence illustrating their role and form of operation is 
sparse.  Gathering together evidence to demonstrate how such inter-personal networks 
supported economic co-ordination over distances requires an appreciation of the social 
history of the groups in question and some archive evidence of the decision-making 
process.  In what follows, an attempt has been made to use a specific case-study to 
demonstrate the efficacy of a network arrangement, both in its own terms and in 
relation to an alternative mechanism which broke down before it could be brought into 
operation.  The case in question concerns the circumstances which led to the formation 
of the Borneo Company Limited, one of the very earliest examples of a British-
registered and financed joint stock limited liability company which was designed to be 
used as a conduit for foreign direct investment. 
 
Origins of the Borneo Company Limited 
 
 The Borneo Company Limited (BCL) was founded in London as a joint stock, 
limited liability company on 8 May 1856 (Griffiths, 1977: 129-30).  The company‟s 
origins, however, are to be found more than a decade earlier when a retired army 
officer of the British East India Company, James Brooke, acquired control of a tract of 
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land in Borneo.  Brooke had earlier invested a substantial share of his inheritance to fit 
out a schooner and travel in search of an opportunity to trade in the islands of the East 
Indies (Longhurst, 1956: 16).  Having set up a base in Kuching, on the north coast of 
Borneo, Brooke provided the local ruler of Sarawak, Muda Hassim, an uncle of the 
neighbouring Sultan of Brunei, with protection against raiding tribes (Uchibori, 1988: 
253).
1
  Brooke‟s intervention quickly suppressed the revolt and in reward for this act 
of military opportunism Brooke was granted a settlement by the Sultan of Brunei 
which gave him authority over the region of Sarawak.  Thus in 1841, Brooke assumed 
the title of Rajah and began to exert control over the indigenous tribes and explore the 
possibilities for developing a trade in the local primary resources. 
 Brooke‟s position as Rajah of Sarawak, however, was not immediately 
sanctioned by the British government.  On the contrary, an official inquiry into 
Brooke‟s conduct was instituted at which Brooke himself was called to give evidence 
(Tarling, 1982).  Not until five years had passed, and the inquiry had cleared Brooke of 
any wrongdoing, did the relationship between the British government and the “White 
Rajah” of Sarawak begin to develop in a productive way.  An important factor which 
served to cement Brooke‟s relationship with the British authorities was the decision by 
the Sultan of Brunei in 1846 to cede the nearby island of Labuan to Britain for use as a 
naval base and as a refitting port for ships engaged in suppressing piracy (Havinden 
and Meredith, 1993: 44).  In 1847, Brooke was appointed as British governor of the 
colony of Labuan, and as consul general to the island of Borneo.  The following year, 
Brooke‟s status with the British authorities rose still further when he was knighted. 
 During the period of the 1840s, as he struggled to establish his claim to 
authority in Sarawak, Brooke formed a relationship with Henry Wise, a London-based 
merchant who sought to exploit the potential profits offered by the control of natural 
resources in Sarawak and Labuan.
2
  In 1850, the monopoly rights to trade between 
Sarawak and Britain were vested by the British government in a trading company 
called the Eastern Archipelago Company (EAC) which was officially granted its Royal 
                                               
1   Discussing the position of the indigenous Iban ethnic group, Uchibori notes that, “Iban society in 
the pre-Brooke period was in a condition of perpetual, if often latent, warfare.” 
 
2   According to the archives of the Borneo Company Limited, Wise first proposed the idea of a 
partnership to Brooke in 1843.  Inchcape Archives (IA), BP Ms27278. 
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Charter in 1851.  The principal shareholder of the EAC was Henry Wise, who had 
authority for managing the trade between Brooke‟s settlement and the merchant 
houses of London.  Plans were drawn up to commence trade in antimony, supplies of 
which were already being generated as a by-product of the small scale gold mining 
operations developed by the indigenous Chinese population.
 3
  Various merchant 
houses in Britain, including the Glasgow and London-based partnership of R & J 
Henderson, has already agreed to put up capital in order to help finance the operations 
of the EAC. 
 The network structure created by the formation of EAC is depicted in Figure 1 
using the conventions developed by Casson (1997).  In this form of exposition, the 
basic objective is to separate out the flows of physical resources in an economic system 
from the flows of information which are used to co-ordinate them.  Thus material 
resources, shown as double lines, flow between plants, which are illustrated as squares.  
The process of co-ordinating these flows is undertaken by a group of economic actors, 
some of whom are based at the same locations as the plants themsleves, but more 
importantly by merchants and others who operate away from the location of the 
physical activities.  Linkages between these agents, who are identified by circles, are 
shown as single lines.  One important point to note is that, whilst the resource channels 
flow in only one direction (with compensating factor and financial flows balancing the 
equation but not shown in the diagrams) information flows in both directions. 
 A diagramatic exposition of this type can be used to incorporate all the flows of 
economic significance in a network, but the crucial element in analysing such economic 
systems is the co-ordination process denoted by the information flows shown in Figure 
1.  In this depiction of the proposed EAC co-ordinating network, the principal 
economic information flows between Henry Wise in London and an agent of the EAC 
in Sarawak.  Brooke, the sovereign government, communicates with both, in the case 
of the agent face-to-face and in the case of Wise via correspondence.  The diagram 
also shows the group of financiers, including R. & J. Henderson, whose financial 
support of EAC is illustrated by the „spring‟ symbol which indicates the role of such 
financiers in absorbing financial fluctuations.  The firm and its officers are enclosed by 
                                               
3   Antimony is a bluish white metal that had been mixed with lead for use in the production of 
ammunition, and with tin for the manufacturing of “type-metal” for printing. 
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an elipse, designed to demonstrate that the information flows within this space are 
complemented by formal institutional arrangements.  One particularly important point 
which Figure 1 illustrates is that the EAC network served to provide a linkage between 
Brooke and Henderson which was to be of great significance in the future development 
of the trade between Sarawak and Britain. 
 
Figure 1: Proposed Network for Eastern Archipelago Company, c.1850 
y1y1
Sarawak Great Britain
x1
m1
s1
x2
m2
r
f
Key:
y1 = Chinese Mine 
x1 = Godown
x2 = Godown
s1 = James Brooke
m2 = Henry Wise
r  = EAC
f   = R & J Henderson 
m1 = EAC Agent
and others
 
 
 Before this trading network actually began to operate, however, a disagreement 
arose over the level of Wise‟s remuneration.  Brooke, unable to discuss the issue 
directly with Wise, prohibited the EAC from engaging in any trading activities out of 
Sarawak and instituted a series of law suits to have the company‟s Royal Charter 
rescinded.  At the same time, the Henderson merchants withdrew their offer of 
financial backing for Wise and, by so doing, strengthened their standing and credibility 
with Brooke.  The Royal Charter of the EAC was terminated in 1851 and although the 
company continued for a period of time to conduct an export trade in coal from the 
island of Labuan, in 1857 the shareholders voted to dissolve the company.  Thus the 
EAC was ultimately wound up in 1862 after an abortive attempt to sell out to BCL,
4
 
and Wise‟s interests in the resources of Sarawak was terminated (Tarling, 1982). 
                                               
4   The BCL board refused a proposal from EAC in October 1859.  IA. BP. MS27178/1. 
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 From an economic perspective, the inability of Brooke and Wise to reach an 
accord from their geographically remote locations is readily explicable from bilateral 
bargaining theory.  EAC‟s monopoly control of the trade links between Sarawak and 
Britain had the effect of neutralising Brooke‟s own monopoly over the resources of the 
hinterland which his position as local sovereign bestowed on him.  The disagreement 
between Brooke and Wise over the latter‟s remuneration was therefore a predictable, if 
not inevitable, outcome of a bilateral monopoly trading position with no determinant 
solution.  Once Brooke had established his political credibility in London, his interests 
were better served by gaining independence from the EAC and forging links with a 
more competitive mercantile network over which he could exert greater leverage from 
his monopoly position.  Thus the arrival in Sarawak of Ludwig Helms, a Danish 
merchant who had previously been operating out of Singapore, offered Brooke the 
opportunity to create an alternative channel between Sarawak and Britain. 
 Helms‟ activities in Singapore had brought him into contact with the Glasgow-
based merchant house of MacEwen & Co., another group of Scottish merchants active 
in South-East Asia, which operated branches in Batavia (Java) and Manilla as well as 
Singapore.  Control of this family-based trading network had passed into the hands of 
Robert MacEwen in 1849, and its branch in Singapore had at that time been placed 
under the supervision of Robert MacEwen‟s former clerk, John Harvey (Longhurst, 
1956: 17).  Harvey had quickly established himself as a leading member of the 
Singapore mercantile community and he and Helms must have become acquainted 
before the Dane‟s departure for Sarawak.  After the removal of EAC‟s charter in 1851, 
therefore, MacEwen‟s office in Singapore began to act as an agency for Brooke, with 
Helms managing affairs in Sarawak.
 5
  For the purposes of conducting this Borneo 
trade, Harvey registered a firm with the Singapore Chamber of Commerce which he 
called the Borneo Company. 
 Following the creation of the Borneo Company in Singapore, Sarawak‟s export 
trade passed through the hands of the MacEwen merchants within the trading network 
                                                                                                                                      
 
5   Although Griffiths (1977: 129) states that in 1851, when Helms first arrived in Sarawak, he was 
“in no way connected with MacEwen & Co.”, documents in the Inchcape archive from the High Court 
in London shows that Helms had been employed by MacEwen & Co. for a period of time prior to the 
formation of BCL in 1856. 
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illustrated by Figure 2.  The channelling of the physical trading flows through 
Singapore now became a formalised feature of the network arrangements, illustrated 
by the double lines, rather than simply an incidental consequence of Singapore‟s role as 
the South-east Asia trading hub.  In co-ordination terms, Harvey‟s intermediatory role 
in Singapore placed him at the centre of the information exchanges.  As well as linking 
together the two ends of the trading system, via his communications with Helms and 
Brooke in Sarawak and the MacEwen merchants in Britain, Harvey also maintained the 
link between Brooke and Henderson that had first been created by the flotation of the 
EAC.  Harvey‟s Singapore-based Borneo Company thus embraced the critical linkages 
that would serve to underpin the London-based Borneo Company Limited when this 
assumed the core co-ordinating role in 1856 even though, in the event, additional 
networks were drawn into the arrangements before the institutional framework 
emerged in its final form. 
 
Figure 2: The Singapore-based Borneo Company Network, 1851-6 
y1
Sarawak Great Britain
x1
m1
s1
x2
m3
Singapore
x3
m2  f
Key:
s1 = James Brooke
m1 = Ludwig Helms 
m2 = John Harvey
m3 = MacEwen & Co.
 f  = R. & J. Henderson & Co.
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Creating an integrated operation 
 
 During the early 1850s, as the opportunities for expanding the trade of 
Sarawak became apparent, plans were developed to float a private joint stock company 
in London.  The desirability of forming a London-based joint stock company clearly lay 
in the ability it provided to raise additional investment capital in order to build the 
business up.  From Brooke‟s point of view, however, transferring the control of the 
Borneo Company to London increased the problem of determining whether his own 
interests were being adequately served.  Before locking himself into a new arrangement 
for handling the Sarawak trade therefore Brooke solicited a trusted acquaintance, John 
Charles Templer, to serve as his representative in London.  With this arrangement in 
hand, Brooke was prepared to allow the merchant firm of R.& J. Henderson to 
promote the Borneo Company Limited (BCL) as a joint stock, limited liability 
enterprise, utilising the newly passed legislation granting limited shareholder liability 
for private companies registered in Britain. 
 The authorised capital of BCL at the time of its formation was £60,000, issued 
in 600 shares of £100.  The single main providers of this investment capital were the 
members of the Henderson firm itself, who between them subscribed to 20 per cent of 
the first issue, and one of the partners, Robert Henderson, was appointed as the first 
chairman of BCL.
6
  Brooke‟s ally John Charles Templer took a 5 per cent holding and 
was appointed as deputy chairman.  Of the remaining four board members, two were 
drawn from MacEwen & Co. including John Harvey who was transferred from the 
Singapore branch to act as managing director in London.  In addition, as was 
commonly the case, BCL‟s board also included a Member of Parliament, James Dyce 
Nicol, whose presence ensured both a voice in Parliament and a reputation for 
respectability and sound conduct which was of importance both for attracting new 
investors and establishing good relations with trading partners.  The founding 
directorate of BCL are shown in Table 1. 
 
                                               
6   The shareholding of the Hendersons in BCL had grown to 35 per cent by 1860 and the familiy 
members continued to hold at least one quarter of BCL‟s shares in the period up until the First World 
War.  Manuscripts 398/OL/14 and 398/19 Companies House, London. 
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Table 1: Initial Registered Board of Directors of the Borneo Company Ltd. (1856) 
 
Designation Name and Affiliation Initial Shareholding 
  Number Percentage 
Chairman Robert Henderson.  Also of R. & 
J. Henderson, Merchants 
 
110 
 
18.3 
Vice Chairman John C. Templer.  Also member 
of H.M. Court of Exchequer 
 
30 
 
5.0 
Member James D. Nicol.  Also a Member 
of Parliament 
 
60 
 
10.0 
ditto John Smith.  Affiliation not 
specied. 
 
35 
 
5.8 
ditto Francis Richardson.  Also a 
partner in MacEwen & Co. 
 
60 
 
10.0 
ditto John Harvey.  Also a partner in 
MacEwen & Co. 
 
Nil 
 
Nil 
 
Sources: IA. BP. MS27178/1, manuscript 398/2, Companies House 
 
 At the time of its formal incorporation,  BCL was designed to facilitate trade 
between Sarawak and Britain in much the same way that EAC had earlier.  The 
difference in structure between BCL and EAC was quite limited, as a comparison of 
Figures 1 and 3 illustrates, but it now constituted a set of arrangements that Brooke 
was content to place his trust in.  This trust between Brooke and the officers of BCL is 
illustrated using Casson‟s convention of double arrows to represent the information 
flows.  A further point of distinction between EAC and BCL is that the latter company 
was in a position to use its capital to undertake direct investments in Sarawak.  Indeed, 
the company‟s Deed of  Settlement (effectively its Articles of Association) classified its 
main purpose as being: 
For working ores veins and minerals of various sorts in the Island of 
Borneo or in some part or parts thereof and of raising and getting 
Antimony, Coal, Iron, Ironstone, Lead, Tin, Copper and other metals 
and minerals there from and of dressing and smelting and manufacturing 
the same or some of them when raised and of exporting the same....and 
also for carrying on business in all parts as general and commission 
merchants, ship owners, miners, agriculturists and planters. 
 
Thus the capital resources of BCL were designed to be used in support of mineral 
extraction.  As such, the company‟s most important asset constituted its agreement 
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with James Brooke which granted BCL, in exchange for payment of royalties to the 
Sarawak Treasury, the following development rights: 
To take over and work Mines, Ores, Veins or Seams of all descriptions 
of minerals in the Island of Borneo, and to barter or sell the produce of 
such workings. 
 
In 1857, therefore, BCL increased its share capital to £250,000
7
 and began the process 
of exploration of the mineral deposits which the company now sought to exploit, but 
which lay largely within the area already settled by Chinese immigrants (Jones, 1986: 
198). 
 
Figure 3: Proposed Network of the Borneo Co. Ltd at its Incorporation, 1856 
 
y1y1
Sarawak Great Britain
x1
m1
s1
x2
m2
r
f
Key:
y1 = BCL mine 
x1 x2 = Godowns
s1 = James Brooke
m2 = John Harvey,
  Robert Henderson,
        John Templer
r  = BCL
f   = R & J Henderson
m1 = Ludwig Helms
 
 
 The organisational structure of BCL reflected the fact that the company was 
designed to manage its own resource investments abroad.  John Harvey was installed 
at the company‟s office in London as managing director, and from here he maintained 
the dialogue with Helms and Brooke in Sarawak that he had previously conducted 
                                               
7   The additional capital was raised through the issue of shares to a relatively small circle of private 
investors.  Manuscript 398/OL/14 and 398/19 Companies House provide a list of these investors.  No 
recourse was made to financial intermediaries for the purpose of raising capital at this point. 
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from his office in Singapore.  Harvey‟s main responsibility in this capacity was to 
oversee the transfer of both the technology and human resources which were required 
for BCL to successfully prosecute its business objectives.  In addition, the London 
office arranged for the analysis of any new geological specimens which were 
discovered in Sarawak (Longhurst, 1956: 55), and gathered intelligence that was felt 
to be of strategic importance, for which significant payments were sometimes made.
8
 
 BCL‟s direct investments in mineral extraction were also supported by a policy 
of vertical integration into related activities. The decision to invest in shipping facilities 
occupied a number of BCL‟s early board meetings in 1856 before an investment of 
£12,500 was made in a steam ship to serve the coal trade between Sarawak and 
Singapore.  The purchase of a second ship, soon afterwards, indicates that the BCL 
board were unwilling to trust their need for regular berths to the vagaries of the free 
market in chartered commercial shipping and the cargo consignment trade provided by 
independent operators.  These investments, which were held in a subsidiary company 
called the Sarawak Steamship Co., provided the first regular steamship service 
between Kuching, the main port of Sarawak, and Singapore. 
 Further expansion into upstream value-adding activities was proposed in 
relation to the trade in antimony.  In 1864, the BCL management in London 
discovered that a patent had been registered by a Mr Todd for using antimony in the 
production of paint.  An agreement was concluded with Todd for developing the 
process as an employee of BCL under which he was to be paid an annual salary of 
£500 for superintending the manufacture, together with a fee based on the number of 
tons of antimony processed.
9
  In the event, no paint ever seems to have been 
manufactured, but the episode illustrates both the willingness of BCL to expand into 
related activities in Britain itself, and the highly active management role which the 
London headquarters played in developing the organisation. 
 Expansion via vertical integration, in support of BCL‟s mining activities in 
Sarawak, was coupled with horizontal expansion as the company began to deal in 
                                                                                                                                      
 
8   See, for example, the decision to pay a Mr Cruickshank £50 for “important information” from the 
Far East.  Minutes of the Board of Directors of BCL, 1 July 1856,  IA, BP Ms27178/1. 
 
9   IA. BP. Ms27178/2. 
 
 14 
exports of sago, oil, pepper, tea, hides, coconut, rubber, timber and rice.   As Jones 
(1986: 202-3) points out, this often involved some degree of local production capacity, 
such as in the case of sago manufacturing, for which Helms founded a refinery where 
the raw material was purified prior to export to Britain.  Like much of the mining 
activity, BCL wrested control of the sago plantations from immigrant traders, assuring 
full control of property rights before engaging in direct investment.  In relation to its 
activities in Sarawak, therefore, BCL utilised the network structure in which it 
operated to support the international transfer of know-how and to explore new 
markets for the various natural resources which Brooke‟s control of the region allowed 
access.  The head office in London was the hub of this process and provided BCL with 
its strategic dynamism. 
 
International Expansion and Diversification 
 
 The initial focus of BCL‟s operations on the resources of Sarawak did not 
preclude the company from trade and investments elsewhere in the Far East.  
Naturally, given the position of Singapore as the trading centre of the region, BCL 
retained an office on the island.  However, Harvey himself remained in Singapore only 
sufficiently long to divest himself of other commercial interests before taking up the 
role of managing director in London.  Meanwhile, around the time that BCL was being 
set up in London, Helms travelled to Bangkok in order to establish a branch for 
MacEwen & Co. in a market where commercial relations had only been put on an 
official basis.  A treaty had been negotiated between the governments of Britain and 
Siam by Sir John Bowring in 1855 which came into force only in April 1856 (Falkus, 
1989: 128).  Helms himself returned to Sarawak soon after the branch had been set up, 
and it was subsequently placed under the control of Samuel Gilfillan who had 
previously worked for the Singapore merchants Gilfillan, Wood & Co. (Jones, 1986: 
20).  MacEwen & Co. obtained their first contract to export rice from Siam in 
September 1856, and a branch was set up in Hong Kong the same year which imported 
consignments of rice from the operation in Bangkok (Longhurst, 1956: 35).  A board 
minute at BCL‟s London headquarters noted that MacEwen & Co.‟s branches in 
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Singapore, Batavia and Siam were formally transferred to BCL in 1857.
10
  Thus, 
within the period of a year, the board of BCL assumed control of a Far East trading 
network, as well as the company‟s initial investments in Sarawak. 
 As this trading network was being assimilated, however, BCL‟s development 
was suddenly turned violently off course.  A combination of the threat provided by 
BCL‟s proposed mining investments, and a decision to demand increased tax payments 
for opium by the Brooke regime, led to a revolt by the Chinese in Sarawak during 
which a young consultant metallurgist working for BCL was murdered (Jones, 1986: 
198).  This uprising of 1857 was a severe blow to the company which badly shook the 
confidence of the shareholders in London.  Although the revolt was quelled relatively 
quickly, the planned investment programme in Sarawak was dislocated by the need to 
restore a climate in which mining could safely recommence.  In 1858, Helms left 
Sarawak and travelled to London to discuss the position with the board of directors. 
According to Longhurst (1956: 53), after a period of negotiation Helms was formally 
appointed as BCL‟s manager for Sarawak and set sail once again for the Far East in 
February 1860.  However, not until some eight years after his return to Kuching did 
BCL begin to make serious headway with its investments in Sarawak. 
 The uprising in Sarawak created both a problem and an opportunity for the 
board of BCL in London.  Finding itself with surplus capital funds at its disposal, the 
company was in a position to support alternative investments abroad which held the 
potential for profits.  One such opportunity was brought to the board‟s attention by the 
allied firm of Messrs. George Henderson & Co., merchants of Calcutta, whose 
principal, George Henderson, was related to Robert Henderson of R. & J. Henderson 
& Co.  founders of BCL.  At the time of the revolt in Sarawak, George Henderson had 
been on a visit to Calcutta - which was itself in the throes of the mutiny - and had met 
up with George Acland, an English entrepreneur who had set up India‟s first jute 
spinning mill in 1855 (Morris, 1982: 567; Wallace, 1909: 17).  The jute industry in 
Bengal had been stimulated by the Crimean War which had cut off supplies of Russian 
flax to the sacking industry in Dundee and, as a result, exports of jute yarn from India 
to Britain had surged (Goswami, 1991; Sarkar, 1989).  Although Acland‟s initiative 
                                               
10   IA. BP. Ms27178/1. There is no record of MacEwen‟s branch in Manilla being transferred to the 
control of BCL however. 
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had not been very successful, his experience suggested the possibility of manufacturing 
jute sacks directly within India.  Henderson therefore persuaded the board of BCL to 
invest in an integrated power spinning and weaving mill for the manufacture of gunny 
bags near Calcutta, at Barnagore (Morris, 1982: 567; Chapman, 1992: 118) which 
George Henderson & Co. managed on BCL‟s behalf.  Shortly afterwards, BCL also 
invested in a sugar mill in Bengal, which George Henderson & Co. also managed. 
 By the time that these investments were made, therefore, BCL had developed 
into a complex international trading and investment network, the elements of which 
drew on a wide range of personal and commercial groupings (see Figure 4).  The 
decision to invest in India struck certain contemporary observers as being inconsistent 
with the company‟s nominal affiliation to Borneo. Assessing developments in June 
1858, for example,  the Hong Kong Daily News - aware of BCL‟s branch operations 
within its own locality - felt compelled to comment: 
that this Borneo Company not only trades in the capacity of an 
untrammelled individual with as much regard to Borneo as to any other 
places in which he might have business relations, but it is also 
embarking large sums in the erection of machinery in Bengal.... Such an 
enterprise is, of course, highly laudable, but what in the name of all that 
is consistent, has the Borneo Company to do with it? 
 
The passage seems to convey more than the simple sense of unease regarding the 
operations of a company whose nominal identity suggests a fixed locus of activity.  
Rather, it serves to illustrate the sheer novelty of a company such as BCL which in the 
mid-nineteenth century co-ordinated the operations of a multinational collection of 
fixed investments from its headquarters in London. 
 
The Nature of the Borneo Company Limited 
 
 Owing to its foundation at the very threshold of the limited liability era in 
Britain, BCL can realistically be characterised as being among the pioneers of a new 
form of British foreign investment.  Wilkins has demonstrated that the period from 
1870 witnessed a rapid growth in British foreign investment through the medium of 
just such limited liability companies.  As legally independent entities designed to 
operate abroad the distinctive feature of these companies, serving to separate them 
analytically from the subsidiaries of conventional multinational corporations, is that 
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they were all, at origin, administratively independent organisations (Wilkins, 1988: 
262).  This managerial independence is certainly applicable to BCL at its foundation in 
1856.  However, the London office of BCL quickly emerged as a centre of 
international co-ordination for the management of investments in different parts of 
Asia, thus shifting its orientation from that of a free-standing company to that of the 
strategic corporate centre of an international business enterprise. 
 In performing the functions of technology transfer via foreign direct 
investment, and international managerial co-ordination via information flows, the 
headquarters of BCL transformed itself into a multinational direct investor (Casson, 
1997: 227).  Two main factors distinguish this form of multinational to that described 
by Chandler (1987).  Firstly, the British firm‟s markets were not in the countries in 
which they invested, meaning that a company such as BCL did not need to engage 
abroad their own salaried sales force in order to market their goods.  Secondly, British 
multinational investors such as BCL, whose origins were in trade, inclined naturally 
towards utilising existing inter-personal networks for the purpose of managerial co-
ordination, rather than seeking to develop the hierarchical management system which 
American mass producers had utilised at home and which they attempted to use as they 
extended their productive operations abroad.
11
 
 The fact that BCL also accords with Chapman‟s (1985) concept of an 
investment group, serves to support his contention that such organisations can be 
viewed as the British equivalent of early American multinational corporations.  BCL‟s 
development into an international management and investment network brought 
together MacEwen & Co. and George Henderson & Co.‟s location specific knowledge 
and contacts, with important political, social, technical, factor and financial networks in 
Britain as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
                                               
11   It is perhaps worth noting that even American companies with well-developed administrative 
hierarchies at home needed to rely to a greater degree on personal trust in their early overseas 
investments.  Thus management of the American Tobacco Company‟s investments in China through 
BAT were largely delegated to a trusted ally (albeit a salaried employee of the company) of the 
chairman James Duke (Cox, 1997). 
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Figure 4: Networks Related to the Board of Directors of BCL, 1856 
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 Chapman‟s paper, however, has rather obscured the significance of BCL as an 
example of an investment group by attributing its operations to the Hendersons, to 
whom it was merely allied.  In addition, Chapman‟s concept of an investment group 
extends beyond the role of co-ordinated management of transferred technology, to 
embrace a situation where agency houses engaged in the provision of financial services.  
Thus his paper includes within the definition of investment group the agency houses in 
Calcutta which assumed the role of quasi-banks in the early nineteenth century by 
channelling local investment funds into various activities - such as indigo plantations - 
which in some cases they subsequently assumed the management responsibility for.  
However, the essential feature of both American multinationals and British investment 
groups as co-ordinating mechanisms of international business is that their foreign 
investment revolved around the transfer of technology (including management), rather 
than simply the transfer of finance which became the principal role of merchant banks.  
Chapman‟s definition of an investment group fails to properly distinguish between 
these two forms of investment and has subsequently led to a degree of understandable 
confusion (Turrell and Van-Helten, 1987; Chapman, 1987). 
 The early history of BCL, therefore, requires an appreciation of the way in 
which international mercantile networks, linked to other relevant networks in Britain, 
were able to provide the framework for international business co-ordination in a world 
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where international transportation was slow and communication was limited, before 
the telegraph, to a speed dictated by that system of transportation.  These international 
business networks relied for their success on the trust which spatially remote 
individuals were able to place on the integrity of interdependent decision-makers.  In 
the absence of such a climate of trust, as the episode of the EAC illustrates, feasible 
mechanisms of international co-ordination were liable to break down.  The 
geographical extensiveness of BCL‟s international business network was also 
important to its success.  Without the opportunity to invest capital in the jute 
manufacturing plant in Bengal, via their link with George Henderson & Co., there 
seems to be little prospect that BCL could have survived the Chinese uprising in 
Sarawak which broke out within a year of the company‟s formation. 
 Of course, the benefits of trust between individuals, whilst it reduces the costs 
related to adverse behaviour (e.g. opportunism, shirking), does not in itself guarantee 
the managerial competence of the decision-maker in question.  Trust is not a substitute 
for management expertise per se and it may well have been the case that organisations 
with managerial hierarchies were more effective at promoting the various skills of the 
management art.  There is certainly circumstantial evidence, for example, to suggest 
that Helms made a number of inept management decisions whilst in charge of 
operations in Sarawak, and it is perfectly clear that the relationship between him and 
the board in London deteriorated badly in the early 1870s.  In addition, some 
opportunities for gaining economies of scope from the company‟s range of operations 
were undoubtedly not exploited by BCL‟s management during its formative years.  
That said, however, the international business networks of inter-personal trust that 
were fashioned by the early mercantile trading groups as they expanded into foreign 
investment do seem to have been an essential factor in facilitating a managerial 
capacity for companies who, like BCL, must be considered as the world‟s first truly 
multinational enterprises. 
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